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There has been a dramatic shift in U.S. social welfare policy in the 1990s.  
Diverting from helping non-working families in the past, a new focus has been placed on 
assisting low-income working families with children.  This significant change was 
accompanied by a nearly fifty percent decline in Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC), which was replaced with Temporary Assistance to Needy Families 
(TANF).  The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(PRWORA) of 1996 that enacted TANF at a national level was the culmination of the 
nation’s effort to move families on assistance off welfare to self-sufficiency through 
work.   
While most policy analysts have attributed this decline to the success of welfare 
reform, some scholars have pointed out the fact that the substantial decline occurred 
before these newly implemented welfare policies came into effect and/or before welfare 
recipients reached the time limits.  Several studies have examined why such an 
unprecedented decline in the AFDC/TANF caseloads occurred after 1994, when 
caseloads reached its highest point since 1960 (The Brookings Institute, 2001).  These 
previous studies attributed the decline in the welfare caseloads during the 1990s primarily 
to the adoption of federal AFDC waivers, TANF, and a booming economy (Blank, 1997; 
CEA, 1997, 1999; Moffitt, 1999; Ziliak et al., 2000). 
However, the previous studies overlooked an important change in U.S. family 
policy in the 1990s—the series of expansions of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC).  
In particular, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) in 1990 and 1993 
significantly increased credit rates and the EITC’s maximum benefit and expanded 
income eligibility limits.  OBRA 1993 required that the EITC be fully phased-in by 1996, 
and as a result, the fully phased-in EITC has become the largest benefit program for low-
income working families with children in the United States (see Table 6A.1 of Scholz 
and Levine, 2001, for complete data).   
Moreover, the success of the federal EITC has led a number of states to enact 
state EITCs that supplements the federal EITC.  Altogether, 15 states and the District of 
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Columbia now offer state EITCs based upon the federal credit rate.1  As previous 
research supports, state EITCs are well-targeted work incentive programs that reduce 
poverty among children by subsidizing low wages in the form of a refundable tax credit.    
Therefore, state EITCs are also expected to have substantially contributed to declining 
welfare caseloads in the 1990s.   
The primary objective of this study is to estimate the effect of the fully phased-in 
EITC on welfare caseloads, controlling for other policy, demographic, and political 
factors.  The EITC provides people incentive to enter the labor market and increases low-
income workers’ combined disposable income from both wages and EITC subsidy.  This 
study, thus, hypothesizes that the federal EITC helped the low-income workers to leave 
welfare rolls.  In addition, this study estimates the potential effect of the EITC on welfare 
caseload reduction under the assumption that the EITC have sustained purchasing power.  
Secondly, this study hypothesizes that the adoption of state EITCs also contributed to the 
decline in the welfare caseloads in the 1990s.  Thirdly, the study examines what role the 
variation in waiver and TANF policies has played in welfare caseload trends.  This study, 
which includes data from more years than the previous studies, attempts to examine how 
state variations in work-enforcement provisions affect the welfare caseloads in the longer 
run. 
This study employs a panel of annual state caseload data from 50 states and the 
District of Columbia between 1994 and 2000.  The major data source for this study was 
taken from the Technical Report of the Council of Economic Advisors to the President in 
1999.  Combining cross-section and time-series data, the fixed-effects model is used to 
examine the factors associated with the reduction in welfare caseloads from 1994 to 
2000.  To separate the effects of the EITC from the compounding effects of other factors 
on the welfare caseloads, this study controls for state policy variations in federal AFDC 
waivers as well as in TANF, business cycle, demography, and political influence in each 
state in each year.  To estimate the precise impact of the EITC on caseloads, this study 
also controls for state-specific effects as well as time-specific effects.  
Results of this study support that, holding other factors constant, it is estimated 
that a one percent increase in the EITC phase-in rate (families with 2 or more children 
receive 40 cents for additional dollar earned if their incomes is less than $9,700 in 2000)   
is associated with a 1.2 percent decrease in caseload rate, as the results from the basic 
model show.  This means that the federal EITC would have moved nearly 722,525 people 
off welfare on the national average in any given year from 1994 to 2000.  The results 
from the simulation showed that the EITC could have been more effective in lowering 
welfare caseloads, should the EITC have sustained against erosion of purchasing power.
 The state EITCs are also estimated to be effective for reducing the welfare 
caseloads.  This result indicates that the state EITCs can be an effective tool for helping 
people move off welfare by supplementing low-income workers’ disposable income and 
could decrease welfare caseloads considerably.   
The results of the impact of work enforcement provisions of welfare reform under 
AFDC waivers and TANF indicate that states with harsher sanctions (full sanctions) and 
                                                 
1 Federal credit rate depends on where a family’s income falls in the 3 different income ranges.  Currently, 
the maximum subsidy rate is 40% of an eligible family’s earned income.  
 33  
time limit/work requirements would have contributed to the decline in the caseloads from 
1994 and 2000.  On the other hand, states with more lenient rules on work provisions 
seem to have an impact on welfare caseloads to a lesser extent.  However, higher 
earnings disregard and family cap provisions did not show a statistically significant 
relationship with welfare caseloads.  
This study has several implications.  First, findings support that the EITC could 
help single mothers move off welfare by making work more attractive alternative to 
welfare receipt.  Second, as shown in simulation of the EITC phase-in rate, maintaining 
an adequate EITC subsidy rate is essential to keep it consistent with the cost of living.  
By supporting work efforts through the EITC, the government can send a stronger 
message to welfare recipients that work rewards.  Third, adopting state EITCs is also an 
effective tool when combined with the federal EITC to help low-income working families 
with children by increasing their earnings and reducing welfare caseloads.  Fourth, given 
the significance of the EITC’s role in families’ economic well-being, social workers need 
to learn swift changes not only in the new welfare programs and eligibility rules but also 
in the legislation.  Integrating such curriculum into social work education will be timely 
and appropriate.  Social workers need to learn how legislation is being made and how 
much impact legislation can have on the people that they work with daily.  This way, 
social workers may be able to provide leadership in informing the public to help state and 
local decision makers carry out their new responsibilities more effectively.  
Lastly, it is essential to note that while the EITC is an effective instrument to fight 
poverty while providing work incentives, we should be mindful of the fact that the EITC 
does not help the children in the most destitute families, such as those with nonworking 
parents.  Therefore, the EITC cannot replace the safety net.  A more universal approach 
to support all needy families with children should be considered.  
Much still remains unknown about how the devolution of welfare policy has 
affected the well-being of American children.  The caseload studies do not answer under 
what conditions these children have been living after the families left welfare rolls.  
Future research should answer under what circumstances and with what types of state 
policy options the families and their children fare better after leaving welfare rolls.  
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